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Paper was prepared for the project: "Economic Reforms in the former USSR" (Reformy gospodarcze na terenie dawnego ZSRR), financed by the Comittee of Scientific Research (Komitet Badań Naukowych). Political considerations were one reason for this advocacy. They dominated among certain Russian politicians dreaming about rebuilding in some way the former empire or at least keeping the special relations with former Soviet republics. The notion of the "near abroad" (blizhnee zarubezhie) reflects this philosophy in the best way. However, also many leading politicians in FSU countries supported for quite long the idea of the common ruble area for various economic and political reasons. Economic support for the common ruble area came from the wish not to disrupt the strong trade interrelations between the former Soviet republics. At that time the recent experience with the collapse of CMEA payment area, in the beginning of 1991, made many Western experts reluctant to any radical changes in the trade and payment mechanism on the territory of the FSU.
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I describe the process of monetary disintegration that already started at the end of 1990
when the Soviet Union still existed. Section 4 illustrates the process of monetary disintegration in 1992-1993, after the dissolution of USSR. Section 5 presents a picture about the most important initiative to rebuild the ruble area in 1992-1994. Finally, section 6 contains the discussion on macroeconomic and other consequences of continuing the common currency despite the political disintegration.
The basic economic and political preconditions of the common currency
The rationality of a common currency for a specific territory can be discussed from both an economic and political point of view. In each case two questions need to be answered: (1) What is the economic justification for the specific territory unit to have a common currency?, and (2) Can this territory have common monetary and fiscal policy and a common monetary institution?
The very detailed analysis of these two problems in relation to the former USSR is far beyond the planned limits of this paper. However, even a very brief look into the former Soviet economy gives the negative answers.
The economic question can be discussed on the basis of optimal currency area theory, first proposed by Mundell [1961] and developed by McKinnon [1963] . Both authors made de facto equation between the territory with a single currency and territory with many currencies but convertible one to other at the fixed exchange rate. Ronald
McKinnon [1963, p.717] even wrote that "...a fixed exchange rate system with guaranteed convertibility of currencies is almost the same thing as a single currency regime".
However, both authors missed the problem of transaction costs which still exist under fixed exchange rates (even permanently fixed) and do not exist under single currency regime.
The problem of the optimal currency area occurs when the specific territory (let say A) becomes subject of the supply or demand shock vis a vis other territory (B) changing their bilateral terms of trade. The most simple way to adjust to the shock is to change the exchange rate between A and B currencies. However, it is possible only if they have separate currencies with flexible exchange rate. If not (because both are, for example, the regions of the same country) two other forms of adjustment remain: (i) moving of labor and capital, or (ii) fiscal transfers.
First form of adjustment needs a high factor mobility between shock affected territories {see -e.g. Orlowski, 1994] what is, for example, the case of United States.
However, a free mobility of goods, labor and capital never existed in the former Soviet economy because the allocation of resources was totally or almost totally a subject of central planning and administrative regulation. Significant reallocation of labor under the Stalin great industrialization program in 1930s and 1940s was purely administrative operation violating the human rights and human dignity. It did not differ from the allocation of slaves. Later, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev moving of labor became a more `human' with using more material and political stimulation but never abandoning completely the administrative measures (such as propiska system). It is hardly to expect that after the dissolution of USSR the real free mobility of labor will exist especially when ethnic and cultural factors play a greater role. The same ethnic and cultural factors will also probably limit capital mobility although more depends here on regulatory framework in each newly independent state.
What concerns the second form of adjustment massive inter-regional fiscal transfers are used in many countries such as United States, France, Germany (especially in relation to former GDR) but also among countries being members of the European Union. It was also the case of the former USSR where the differentiated effects of external shock absorption were neutralized by massive fiscal and quasi-fiscal transfers 3 between Soviet republics, mainly from Russia to the non-Russian republics [see - Selm and Dölle, 1993; Orlowski, 1993] 4 . This situation was partly continued in 1992 and in the first half of 1993
[see - Dąbrowski and Antczak, 1994] . However, in mid 1993 Russian authorities decided to stop this practice, at least at the previous scale. It brought the real end of the ruble zone (see -section 4).
As we see from above analyzis free factors mobility on the specific territory and its potential exposure to the common external shocks are two basic rational criteria to have a common currency. If shock is asymmetric and factors mobility limited the affected countries have to choices: fiscal redistribution between them or exchange rate adjustment.
The first method needs at least a kind of political confederation, a second must be connected with abandoning the common currency.
The strong asymmetric exposure of the former USSR to different kind of shocks is out of discussion. The reasons of it lie in the enormous differentiation of the industrial structure between the former Soviet republics. For example, after the two oil shocks in 1970s, when Soviet authorities decided not to adjust the domestic energy prices to the new world prices, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan became the main losers, and other republics started to receive huge indirect subsidies to their substandard manufacturing industries. The situation changed radically when Russia started to adjust the oil and gas prices to the world level which happened in 1992-1993. It is worth to remember that the oil and gas prices adjustment is not the only one structural challenge facing the FSU countries (demilitarization is one of other important issues). It means the FSU countries had and still have to adjust to various asymmetric structural shocks.
The above analyzis becomes a little bit more complicated when we add the problem of transaction costs. Without doubts a common decreases this kind of costs [Selm, 1995] .
It is connected not only with cost of exchange operation but also with the exchange risk (if exchange rate is flexible) and additional rigidities if separate currencies are not fully convertible. This last kind of risk was specially actual in the discussed case because in 1992 or 1993 it was not clear that the new post-Soviet currencies will be at least partly convertible 5 .
Transaction costs become an important argument in favor of common currency when the share of mutual trade is high [Selm, 1995] . It was probably the main argument in favor of continuing the common ruble zone after the dissolution of USSR in the eyes of many Western experts including IMF 6 . But it was also a crucial interpretation mistake.
A fairly large dependence of some Soviet republics on the inter-republican trade, especially of Belarus and Baltics [see - Selm and Wagener, 1993; Orlowski, 1993] did not mean that trade relations were optimal from the point of view of the real comparative advantages of each republic or region and should be continued for any price. They reflected rather results of arbitrary investment decisions (based on political criteria and considerations) and the bargaining process connected with a command system.
After the dissolution of USSR a significant part of former inter-republican trade collapsed not only because of the creation of some trade barriers between FSU countries and uncertainty about the payment system. It occurred mainly because most of this trade was earlier not rational from the point of view of the microeconomic calculation, especially after the energy prices and transportation tariffs were adjusted to world market levels. The serious decrease of military and investment demand played an additional role here. [Samonis, 1995] . The future republican central bank and republican currency were the integral component of this proposal.
A similar intellectual concept named as the New Economic Mechanism (Estonian acronym IME) was proposed by a group of Estonian economists in 1987 and 1988 [seeLainela and Sutela, 1995 Dąbrowski, 1989] . Both republics started to build gradually their future central banks not abandoning in the same time the republican branches of the State Bank of USSR (Gosbank). However, some conflicts around credit emission between both republics and the central Soviet authorities were observed already in 1989 and 1990.
In Latvia the intention to introduce its national currency was announced first time in 1990
only [Lainela and Sutela, 1995] . In the same year Latvia started to build the institution of its central bank.
Although Mikhail Gorbachev and other members of the top Soviet leadership were not ready at that time to accept the independence of the Baltic republics 8 they did not oppose openly to the idea of stronger republican economic autonomy including separate republican currencies. It probably reflected the lack of understanding of the political implications of such an autonomy and more generally -the lack of idea how to reform the Soviet economy.
As However, the logic of political struggle between Russian and Soviet authorities had to lead to more serious consequences sooner or later. In cash turnover the ruble remained a common currency, although the use of monetary substitutes (coupons) expanded due to Russia's rationing of deliveries of ruble cash. This last fact resulted in turn from the increase, in the first half of 1993, in payment for imports from Russia using ruble cash, given the existing limits on technical credits.
In the third phase, various post-Soviet states exited completely from the ruble area by introducing their own national currencies. This process began at the end of June 1992 in Estonia; Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine followed in the summer and autumn of 1992, and
Kyrgyzstan in May 1993.
The fourth phase was the final collapse of the ruble area, which began with the exchange of banknotes by the CBRF on Russian territory at the end of July 1993. After several months of political bargaining over the idea of creating a so-called "new style ruble area" (see Granville and Lushin [1993] and section 5 of the present paper), all remaining post-Soviet states introduced their own currencies. This occurred during the period from September to November 1993. The exception was Tadzhikistan, which introduced its own currency not until May 1995. for Ukraine and Belarus Russian monetary policy was too restrictive -they wanted to issue even more money than they can expect from CBRF. The last group which left the ruble area in autumn 1993 (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia) was simply pushed out from this zone through CBRF operation exchanging ruble banknotes from July 1993 13 . 13 The goal of this operation was not, however, completely clear and were never explicitly stated by its authors. The behavior of the CBRF was not very consistent, as is shown by the almost immediate transfer of 50 billion ruble of new banknotes to Uzbekistan. Thus, another interpretation cannot be ruled out _ that in essence the leadership of the CBRF wanted to throw the other states of the CIS on their knees in order to make them more willing to submit to rejoin the ruble area on the conditions set by the CBRF. If this is the case, then this goal was not attained. Regardless of the intentions underlying the decision of the CBRF, the operation of exchanging banknotes had many negative indirect effects on the monetary system in Russia itself.
Unsuccessful attempts to rebuild ruble area (1992-1994)
From the very beginning of the process of the ruble area's gradual disintegration, endeavors had also been under way to preserve it and then, after partial collapse in 1992, to recreate it.
The history of efforts to preserve or reanimate the ruble area includes a number of agreements signed at a series of summits of CIS states; in general, these were not very concrete and lacked any effective implementation mechanisms. In the meantime, the real course of events tended in exactly the opposite direction: gradual disintegration. Thus, all the monetary and banking agreements were never implemented.
Chronologically the first document of this type was the "Agreement on a Uniform Gurevich, 1992] 14 .
This agreement called, among other things, for the preservation of the ruble as a common legal medium of exchange (although at the same time it allowed for the continued existence of monetary surrogates, and thus did not exclude the possibility of the signatories' introducing their own currencies in the future). Decision mechanisms were also not precisely defined which would have made it possible to conduct a common and effective monetary and fiscal policy.
In Bishkek it was also decided to create an Interstate Bank (Mezhgosudarstvennyi bank), whose "task of first priority" was to be the "...realization of mutual interstate settlements." It was not clear, however, whether this was to be the central emission bank of the ruble area or only a bank for multilateral clearing; the relation of the bank to the republican banks was also not clear. The internal decision mechanism of the bank became a subject of conflict between the signatories of the Bishkek agreement. Russia wanted a quota system modelled after the IMF, which would obviously have given it the decisive say. The other partners preferred the principle of one country, one vote, which in turn was not acceptable for Russia.
The latter problem (the character and method of management of the Interstate Bank)
became the subject of three-month-long negotiations by experts and politicians. Finally, at the next CIS summit in Minsk in January 1993, it was agreed that the Interstate Bank would be an institution organizing multilateral clearing on the basis of the Russian ruble.
Russia received 50 percent of the votes in the Board of the bank; the majority of decisions, however, were to require 75 percent of the votes for approval [see Zhagel', 1993; Seninsky, 1993; SNG, 1993] .
In practice, the Interstate Bank never came into being, in spite of repeated political declarations of the need for its existence. Thus, for example, at the CIS summit in
Moscow on May 14, 1993, a new document, the Economic Union Treaty [see - Kozarzewski, 1994 ], was signed. It affirmed the earlier agreement concerning the Interstate Bank and the intention to preserve the common currency (the ruble).
On the basis of this treaty negotiations concerning the "New Style Ruble Area" (NSRA) were conducted (although no one ever defined how NSRA was to differ from the "old" one). A "mobilizing" factor was undoubtedly constituted by the July ruble exchange, which, in states still officially using the old banknotes, caused a massive flight 6. both countries were to strictly harmonize their budgetary systems, which in practice means that the Belarussian budget was to be accepted by the government of the Russian Federation and the Russian Duma;
7. within three months following the currency unification, Belarus was to adopt the Russian system of wages and salaries for employees in the budgetary sphere, and social and employment policies were to become subject to joint coordination.
Undoubtedly, the Russian -Belarusian treaty was the most concrete agreement concluded for the purpose of bringing about a return to a common currency on at least a portion of the territory of the former USSR. However, it was never ratified and implemented. Belarus did not want to give up the independence of its central bank which would violate the Belarussian constitution. After presidential election in summer 1993 the new President Aleksandr Lukashenko decided de facto to abandon this agreement. Only the first two points (on custom union and on transit issues) were implemented.
Looking at the quite long history of unsuccessful attempts to reconstruct, at least partly, the ruble area it is worth to ask what kind of motives and arguments stood behind them.
These motives were quite obvious in the case of some CIS leaders outside Russia who struggled to the very end for retaining the ruble zone. They represent countries heavily benefiting from Russian financial aid in the past. They believed that remaining in the ruble zone they can continue the inter-republican economic relation from the late USSR period: large fiscal or quasi-fiscal transfers, unlimited deliveries of cheap energy and raw materials, easy market for their substandard manufactured products (or military equipment). All these expectations were not realistic.
Beside the purely economic expectations the political motives played also an 
Economic consequences of maintaining the ruble area.
The existence of time-lag between the disintegration of the political system and abandoning the common currency in the former USSR had an exceptionally unfavorable effect on the tempo and quality of macroeconomic stabilization and systemic reforms in the FSU states and especially in the Russian Federation.
This lag caused enormous transfers of Russian GDP to other post-Soviet states in 1992-1993. The first channel of this transfer was the excessively easy (in the first half of 1992) financing of imports from Russia, which was gradually rendered more difficult until it was finally almost completely brought to a halt in the second half of 1993. The second form of transfers consists of artificially low export prices of Russian raw materials and energy resources. These are either domestic Russian prices or prices which are in fact higher than the domestic prices but still below world prices [see - . The third and final form of support for certain states of the CIS is the tolerance of enormous payments arrears of those customers to Russian suppliers (particularly with regard to the fuel-energy complex). In the remaining part of the analysis we will concentrate primarily on the first form of transfers.
The monetary system as it functioned in the first half of 1992 created -for obvious reasons -huge opportunities for the states of the CIS to import Russian goods. Russian exporters also profited from this situation. The explosion of mutual arrears of Russian enterprises made export to the countries of the former USSR exceptionally attractive.
Importers of Russian goods thus had easy access to cheap credits granted by the various central banks. If we add to this the obvious political motives (the desire to maintain Russian influence and presence in various states), we obtain an almost full picture of the reasons why the system was preserved in spite of its strongly negative consequences for the Russian economy.
It is worth mentioning that in the first months of the Russian transformation (that is, Granville and Lushin [1993] (see table 2) or 1,489 million rubles (8.2% of GDP) according to later estimations [IEA, 1995, pp. 210-211] . In 1993 the total amount of CBRF credits to FSU countries was equal to 4,852 million rubles, i.e. 3.0% of GDP [IEA, 1995, pp. 210-211] . However, most of them were concentrated in the first half of 1993 17 .
In the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 the countries of the CIS, desiring to avoid a deficit of credit rubles, began to use cash rubles in their trade with Russia. The growth of cash deliveries from the CBRF at that period became the main source of financial transfers to the countries of the CIS (see -tables 2 and 3).
Due to the lack of hope of credits repayment, the Russian government and the Supreme Soviet decided in mid 1993 to suspend further grants and transform the credits of 1992-1993 into official state debts of the CIS states to Russia.
As it was said earlier at the end of November 1993, all nations of the former USSR, with the exception of Tadzhikistan, introduced their own currencies. Direct transfers to the states of the CIS were seriously limited, and the "monetary" channel for these transfers was terminated. In 1994 CBRF credits to FSU countries were practically equal zero [IEA, 1995, p. 210-211] .
In 1992-1993 credit to FSU countries became an important source of the monetary expansion of the CBRF (see - 
Conclusions
The history of collapse of the ruble area seems to be a very good empirical lesson both for economic theory and economic policy. It highlights the role of political consensus and institutionalized political union as the basic precondition to have a common currency. If this condition does not exist there is no sense to have a common currency even if the specific territory meets the economic criteria of the optimal currency area. It is worth repeating, however, that the former USSR could hardly be seen as optimal currency area.
Unfortunately, at the end of 1991 when USSR was politically dissolved most politicians and economists in the successor countries failed to make adequate diagnosis in relation to monetary arrangements 18 . They did not receive also the adequate intellectual assistance to solve this problem from the West, especially from the IMF.
It seems that false diagnosis was not a matter of professional ignorance, especially in the case of international financial institutions such as IMF. It rather reflected the political confusion after the sudden collapse of the USSR which was not expected to happen so fast. Western governments were not generally prepared to deal with 15 completely independent post-Soviet states and probably they did not believe that some of them can solve their problems themselves without any kind of Russian protectorate. They were also afraid of chaotic fragmentation of the Soviet empire which might lead to bloody ethnic conflicts and losening control over nuclear weapon 19 . Some of the Western politicians did 18 Looking at two other disintegration experience in the post-communist part of Europe we can notice similar problems in the former Yugoslavia when the new national currencies were introduced in successor countries with some delay comparing to the real political dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Contrary to it, the Czech Republic and Slovakia made separation of their currencies just one month after the dissolution of the Czecho-Slovak federation which allowed both countries to avoid macroeconomic turbulences. Western governments were also afraid of the succession of their financial claims vis a vis former USSR and it was an additional reason for preferring to maintain a monetary and economic union on the territory of the former USSR [see - Dąbrowski and Rostowski, 1995] .
Some of FSU and Western economists seemed to overestimate the negative consequences of collapse of the monetary union. They assumed that maintaining the common currency avoids a trade shock -this was an incorrect diagnosis. A significant part of previous trade links would have collapsed anyway regardless whether the ruble area continued to exist (as it happened inside Russia). The only real cost of abandoning the common currency was connected with higher transaction costs. But it should be compared with costs of maintaining unsustainable monetary arrangements which were far bigger.
Prolonging the process of dissolution of the ruble area significantly raised the costs of all the USSR's successors: Russia failed two macrostabilizations (in 1992 and 1993) and some other FSU countries delayed the start of real market transition for two years or more.
federation to the very end (i.e. summer 1991) was a serious mistake strengthening de facto Serbian imperialistic ambitions. 
